EU migration policy, which forms part of the wider field of justice and home affairs (JHA), is a relatively young area of EU policy-making. The original text of the Treaty of Rome contained no provisions on the coordination or harmonization of asylum and immigration matters. The need to deal with such issues in a European context was first mentioned in the Tindemans Report of 1975, but only received more significant attention during discussions concerning the elimination of internal border controls, following the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau in 1984. Only with the Treaty of Maastricht did migration policy come into the Union framework. Since then, EU asylum and immigration policy has undergone an astonishing ascent from modest and obscure beginnings to an increasingly mature and vibrant field of EU policy-making. At the constitutional level it has shifted, in less than two decades, from an intergovernmental regime in which only a handful member states participated outside the Treaty framework, towards an almost fully communitarized EU policy area. At the EU legislative level-although processes have often been cumbersome and frequently reflected only the 'minimum standards' stipulated in the Treaty (of Amsterdam)-output in quantitative terms has been remarkable (Monar 2010). The rising importance of this policy field has also found prominent expression at the symbolic level. The 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', the broader frame within which EU asylum and immigration policy falls, has been listed as one of the Union's fundamental objectives in the Treaty of Lisbon where it 'ranks' second, ahead of the SEM, CFSP, and EMU.
Introduction
EU migration policy, which forms part of the wider field of justice and home affairs (JHA), is a relatively young area of EU policy-making. The original text of the Treaty of Rome contained no provisions on the coordination or harmonization of asylum and immigration matters. The need to deal with such issues in a European context was first mentioned in the Tindemans Report of 1975, but only received more significant attention during discussions concerning the elimination of internal border controls, following the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau in 1984. Only with the Treaty of Maastricht did migration policy come into the Union framework. Since then, EU asylum and immigration policy has undergone an astonishing ascent from modest and obscure beginnings to an increasingly mature and vibrant field of EU policy-making. At the constitutional level it has shifted, in less than two decades, from an intergovernmental regime in which only a handful member states participated outside the Treaty framework, towards an almost fully communitarized EU policy area. At the EU legislative level-although processes have often been cumbersome and frequently reflected only the 'minimum standards' stipulated in the Treaty (of Amsterdam)-output in quantitative terms has been remarkable (Monar 2010) . The rising importance of this policy field has also found prominent expression at the symbolic level. The 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', the broader frame within which EU asylum and immigration policy falls, has been listed as one of the Union's fundamental objectives in the Treaty of Lisbon where it 'ranks' second, ahead of the SEM, CFSP, and EMU.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain this development of EU migration policy.
Drawing on a revised neo-functionalist framework (Niemann 2006) , four factors are suggested to account for processes of Europeanization in this field: (a) functional pressures; (b) the role of supranational institutions; (c) socialization, deliberation, and learning processes; and (d) countervailing pressures. An analysis of EU migration policy from a (revised) neo-functionlist perspective makes for an interesting case, both empirically and theoretically. In line with the edited volume's main research issue concerning the distribution of policy-making power between the member states and EU institutions, justice and home affairs have been described 'as a possibly decisive battlefield in the struggle between the predominance of the nation-state and supranational integration in Europe' (Monar 1998 137) .
JHA is close to the heart of national sovereignty, and thus thought of as one of the least suitable fields for the workings of the spill-over logic (Hoffmann (1995) [1964] ), i.e. a hard case for neo-functionalist theory. Nevertheless, it has arguably become the most dynamic area of European integration. In addition, we witness differing and seemingly puzzling outcomes across the past three Treaty revisions, with the progressive results coming out of the Amsterdam and Lisbon IGC processes intermitted by the rather meagre outcome emanating from the Nice IGC. This variation across IGC outcomes, and the stop-and-go nature of communitarization processes in this field, further merits a closer investigation of EU migration policy, given the particular purpose of this edited book with its focus on Europeanization processes and their underlying dynamics (as well as status quo pressures).
As alluded to above, this chapter will concentrate on the history-making decisions reached at the level of EU Treaty revisions in order to highlight the most important developments and dynamics of EU migration policy (with particular emphasis on decision rules and the institutional set-up). This focus allows us to obtain the most substantial insights and leverage on the main question(s) of the edited volume within the scope restrictions attached to this contribution. The conceptual framework utilized here goes beyond mere snapshots of particular events, also taking larger processes into consideration by looking at developments in between IGCs. Having said that, one of the inevitable shortcomings of this approach is that micro-level processes will get less attention than they may deserve (and would receive in a full-blown analysis). The chapter concentrates on migration policy broadly defined, which contains more specific issues such as asylum, legal/labour migration, irregular immigration, and the integration of immigrants. The chapter is organized as follows: the first section specifies my analytical framework. Section 2 analyses the development of EU migration until the Treaty of Amsterdam. The third section deals with the Nice IGC. Section 4 investigates the process leading to the last Treaty revision that culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from my findings.
Conceptual framework
The following framework, based on a revised neo-functionalist approach (Niemann 1998 (Niemann , 2006 , should not be regarded as a full-fledged theory. Rather, it posits a number of principles or conceptual axioms which might form a basis for more formal theorizing. The factors presented are intrinsically linked and in some measure interdependent and thus cannot necessarily be treated in isolation. The first three factors (functional pressures, the role of supranational institutions, and socialization, deliberation, and learning) are hypothesized as dynamics, while the fourth (countervailing forces) opposes/counteracts these integrational logics. Therefore, integration is here treated as a dialectical process, subject to both dynamics and countervailing forces. 
Functional pressures
Functional pressures emerge where, due to the interdependence of policy sectors and issue areas, the pursuit of the original goal requires additional integrative action (Lindberg 1963: 10) . In modern polities and economies, interdependence between individual sectors and issues tends to be so extensive that it is difficult to isolate one policy area from another (Haas 1958: 297, 383 ). As such, functional pressures stem from the tensions, contradictions, and interdependencies arising in policy sectors encompassed by the European integration project, and its policies, politics, and polity. The pressures induce policy-makers to take additional integrative steps in order to achieve their original goals. Functional pressures constitute a structural component in the analytical framework. Functional pressures have a strong potential for causing further integration, as intentional actors tend to be persuaded by the functional tensions and contradictions. However, they do not 'determine' actors' behaviour in any mechanical or predictable fashion. Functional structures contain an important element of human agreement, as their outcomes are only actualized where agents accept them as both credible and compelling.
The role of supranational institutions
1 Although my framework strongly draws on neo-functionalist theory (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) , it departs from this theoretical strand in several ways. How the framework relates to the original neofunctionalist approach and its later developments, its underlying assumptions, and inter-paradigm debating points is discussed elsewhere (Niemann 2006) . Hence, this chapter focuses primarily on the empirical insights that the framework-and its analytical components-may provide.
The hypothesis that supranational institutions are promoters of intensified integration is supported through diverse rationales. Firstly, once established, institutions tend to take on a life of their own and grow beyond the bridle of those who created them (Pierson 1996) . Secondly, concerned with increasing their own powers, supranational institutions become agents of integration, because they are likely to benefit from the progression of this process.
Lastly, institutional structures (of which supranational structures are a part) invariably affect how actors understand and form their interests and identities.
The Commission is the most visible agent of integration and as such expedites and drives agreements towards integrative outcomes in a number of ways. For example, it can act as a promotional broker by upgrading common interests, e.g. through facilitating package deals.
Moreover, taking advantage of its central position in a web of policy networks and relationships, the Commission can act as a bourse where problems and interests are traded and through which support for its policies is secured (Mazey and Richardson 1997) . Further, the generally greater depth of expertise enjoyed by the Commission often affords it a substantial measure of influence (Nugent 2001 ).
The Council Presidency
2 has developed into an alternative architect of compromise, over the years. A number of pressures are faced by governments during their six-month stint, such as increased media attention and peer group evaluation, to assume the role of honest and promotional broker (Elgström 2003; Tallberg 2004) . During their Presidency, national officials tend to undergo rapid learning processes about the various national dimensions, which induces a more 'European thinking' and facilitates 'European compromises' (Niemann and Mak 2010; Wurzel 1996: 272, 288 ).
In addition, the European Parliament (EP) has struggled, with no small degree of success, to transform itself from an unelected body with limited powers into an institution commensurate in voice with the Council in the larger part of normal secondary legislation.
The degree of interest group attention paid to it attests this growing clout (Bouwen 2004 ). The Parliament moreover shoulders the lion's share of the (perhaps insupportable) burden of the Union's legitimization. Even at the IGC level its role has (substantially) increased. The EP, arguably for self-aggrandizing reasons, has also been a habitual supporter of further integration (Corbett 2001 ).
Socialization, deliberation, and learning processes
It is hypothesized here that socialization, deliberation, and learning processes taking place in the Community forum expedite cooperative decision-making and consensus formation and thus tend to advance integrative trends. The gradual increase of working groups and committees on the European level has led to a complex system of bureaucratic interpenetration that brings thousands of national and EU civil servants into frequent contact with each other. This network constitutes a prime medium for such processes, due to the development of mutual trust and a certain esprit de corps among officials in Community forums. It is (implicitly) assumed that the significance of socialization and learning processes are positively correlated to the duration and intensity of such interaction (Lewis 1998; Lindberg 1963) .
It is proposed here that not just the quantity, but also the quality of interaction is critical to effective norm socialization and learning processes. We can distinguish between (1) incentive-based learning-the adaptation of strategies to reach basically unaltered and unquestioned goals-and (2) more deeply rooted reflexive learning, i.e. changed behaviour as a result of challenged and scrutinized assumptions, values, and objectives (Nye 1987: 380) , the mere incentives/interests of egoistic actors being inadequate explanation for the latter (Checkel 2001) . Furthermore, given that actors make sense of the world and attribute meaning to their actions thorough speech, the centrality of language to understanding social behaviour and learning cannot be ignored.
The notion of communicative action allows us to attain a more fundamental basis for reflexive learning and to more thoroughly integrate the role of communication.
Communicative action, as devised by Habermas (1981a Habermas ( , 1981b 
Countervailing forces
Since integration cannot be conceptualized solely as a dynamic or integrative process, one must also consider countervailing forces. Hence, integration is assumed here to be a dialectical process, both subject to dynamics and countervailing forces. The latter may induce either stagnation or spill-back. Only by accounting for these countervailing forces can the relative strength of the integrative dynamics active in the process be accurately ascertained.
Governments' autonomy to act may be substantially circumscribed by domestic constraints (Hoffmann 1964; Moravcsik 1993) . They may be hampered directly by agents such as lobby groups, opposition parties, the media/public pressure, or more indirectly by structural limitations, like a country's economy, geography, or administrative structure, especially where they substantially differ from the European mainstream, due to consequent adjustment costs of integration (Héritier 1999 Generally, the 1996-97 IGC has been held to have made significant progress. First, the above analysis suggests that noticeable inroads in terms of supranationalization of Title IV were made. Similarly, the new provisions were described as 'decisive progress' (Brok 1997: 377) or 'a substantial qualitative leap' (Schnappauff 1998: 17) when measured against the yardstick of the ex ante practice. Given the expectations held prior to the IGC, Title IV should be viewed as a real achievement attained 'against all odds ' (Patijn 1997: 38) . The new Title IV in particular fared very well viewed in light of the overall Treaty revision, and has been dubbed 'the main improvement of the Treaty' (Hoyer 1997: 71) . Despite this progress, however, no small distance remained to be covered before arriving at a full-fledged Community method. Most importantly in that respect, qualified majority voting (QMV), codecision, and full jurisdiction by the ECJ would only become possible after five years 'ifand this is a big if-this move finds unanimous backing in the Council' (Monar 1998: 138) .
The Amsterdam Treaty revision
As numerous observers rightly described such a change as 'rather unlikely' (van SelmThorburn 1998: 632; also Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1998), there was a serious risk that Title IV remained only 'a half-way house' (Brinkhorst 1997: 49) .
Functional pressures
During the IGC 1996-97, functional pressures provided a strong impetus driving communitarization of asylum and immigration policy. Two kinds of active functional pressures can be identified. First and foremost, there were pressures stemming from the free movement of persons objective, the realization of which necessitated progress in the areas of external border control, asylum, and immigration to compensate for the elimination of intra- The considerable significance that was attached to it was at least in part because, amongst the four freedoms, the free movement of persons has the most direct bearing on the lives of individual citizens (Fortescue 1995: 28) . Furthermore, failure to properly ensure this objective risked compromising the efficient working of the internal market (Commission 1985) .
The functional rationale can be further explained as follows: states will be reluctant to
give up control of their borders without a guarantee of equivalent protection at external frontiers. The possibility that the restrictive efforts of one member state might be undermined by the liberal policies of another-since 'the free movement of persons also means free movement of illegal immigrants' or rejected asylum-seekers-necessitates the adoption of common policies on asylum-seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants (de Lobkowicz 1994: 104) . Similarly, fears were voiced that the abolition of internal borders would lead to 'asylum-
shopping' and an uncontrollable influx of illegal immigrants (Achermann 1995). The Dublin
Convention sought to address the problem of asylum shopping, by determining the first entry state as the one having to deal with asylum applications. This, however, gave rise to the problem of arbitrariness, given member states' differing standards of reception and varying interpretations of refugee status. Thus in turn minimum standards on the reception of asylumseekers became necessary. To achieve this goal and other flanking measures, a greater use of Community methods was required both to expedite cooperation and to enable outcomes above the lowest common denominator. This rationale for supranationalization was the most widely accepted and articulated one among decision-makers (Benelux 1996; UK Government 1996).
Dissatisfaction with collective goal attainment in this area gave rise to further functional pressure. Effective cooperation in JHA-and particularly asylum and immigration policy- 
The role of supranational institutions
Supranational institutions played a substantial integrative role during the Amsterdam Treaty revision. Prior to the IGC, the Commission had laid the basis for its claim to increased responsibility in migration policy. By presenting well-researched, creative, and balanced proposals, the Commission displayed its aptitude and capacity to contribute to the management of this politically sensitive field (Myers 1995: 296) . Secondly, the Commission made an integrative impact on the IGC by cultivating functional pressures. This practice began long before the Conference. Papademetriou (1996: 22) even suggests the Commission's deliberate promotion of the elimination of internal borders in the 1980s was consciously designed to generate spill-overs in areas related to the free movement of persons. The
Commission repeatedly invoked this rationale both before and during the IGC (Commission 1996). Thirdly, although at IGCs the Commission is only one of many actors making proposals, it can still substantially influence the agenda, as the early decision-making stages are of critical importance in terms of shaping actors' preferences (Peterson 1995 
Socialization, deliberation, and learning processes
In the course of the Amsterdam IGC, socialization, deliberation, and learning processes affected the outcome on migration policy in two respects. First, given that JHA was a relatively new EU policy-making field, the speed and extent to which the new decisionmaking structures, forums, and actor constellations allowed socialization, learning, and communicative action processes, and thus cooperative behaviours to take place, becomes a key question. Such processes were far from developed in the mid-1990s (Niemann 2000) .
Moreover, 'the fact that [. . .] the ministers and ministries involved [were] not yet sufficiently accustomed to the working methods and disciplines of the Council to actively seek ways of making decision-making possible' was referred to as one of two main features 'most unconducive to progress' (Fortescue 1995: 26-7) . Few policy-makers realized that the cumbersome, rigid, and often uncooperative policy process in the area of JHA was an inevitable consequence of as yet underdeveloped socialization and learning processes; routines which would emerge in time (Lipsius 1995: 249 
Countervailing forces
The effects of the countervailing pressures throughout the IGC 1996-97 were moderate.
Immigration and asylum policy touch upon traditional prerogatives of states, and are thus subject to the effects of sovereignty consciousness. It has been held that 'the competent ministers act as policemen of sovereignty' (van Outrive 1995: 395). As noted above, during the IGC negotiations, JHA ministers' attention was, through the launch of the politically expedient Action Plan on Organized Crime, successfully diverted from the Conference by the Dutch Presidency. This development substantially reduced the impact of sovereigntyconsciousness at the IGC (interview 1999). Nonetheless, sovereignty-consciousness did play a role in the Danish and UK opt-outs, though in those cases domestic constraints arising from geopolitical distinctness also contributed to the outcome (Devuyst 1998: 625; Monar 1998: 137) . The most significant domestic constraints seem to have been those which eventually convinced German Chancellor Kohl to refuse an automatic switch to QMV after three years at
Amsterdam. The Kohl government found it difficult to sell it at home, even to their own party.
Several Länder governments opposed QMV for migration issues, mainly because they wanted to protect their prerogatives in an area where they have to bear the financial costs. Kohl needed the support of the Länder to get the Treaty through the Bundesrat. Lacking the political capital to secure both EMU and the shedding of more sovereignty over migration, Kohl opted to prioritize EMU at the expense of migration reform (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999: 68) .
The Nice Treaty revision
The , 3b ). In addition, it was agreed to change Article 62 (2a) (checks at external borders) to QMV and co-decision when agreement on the field of application concerning these matters has been reached. However, the final decision on these (nonbinding) alterations was likewise subject to unanimity. Fourthly, none of the Nice provisions on Title IV accorded any expansion to the role of the Court of Justice. Finally, attempts to shorten the transitional period to three years were unsuccessful (Peers 2006: 44) .
In light of these provisions the progress made at Nice cannot be described as significant, and indeed policy-makers and academics largely agree that the Treaty's achievements were limited (Prodi 2000: 3; Stuth 2001: 11) .
Functional pressures
Compared with the IGC 1996-97, the influence of functional rationales was felt less at Nice.
Pressure from the free movement of persons objective was diminished. That the free movement of persons had not yet become a complete reality was acknowledged by several sources. However, the perceived deficiencies in terms of realizing this principle and the intensity of demanding progress in this area had both decreased compared with the discourse Since Edinburgh in 1992, a growing functional logic was at work from various European Councils through pressures stemming from the decision on future enlargement. Although an exogenous event, enlargement after those internal commitments largely became an endogenous source of pressure for reform of EU decision-making procedures. Once enlargement had become an agreed internal goal, difficulties were foreseen in terms of decision-making for policy areas ruled by unanimity, such as migration policy. Unanimity was already regarded as problematic by some even with only fifteen delegations. With twenty-five member states and the corresponding diversification of interests and increased heterogeneity, it was feared that those areas still governed by unanimity would become substantially susceptible to deadlock. However, the pressure of enlargement was limited as it was not (yet) perceived as immediately imminent (interviews 2002, 2004) .
The role of supranational institutions
The Commission's assertiveness and influence in the area of migration policy was weaker during the IGC 2000 than during the IGC 1996-97. From the outset the Commission was put on the back foot. This was partly due to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 and the subsequent priority of putting its own house in order and also due to the fact that the Commission, itself an item on the agenda, was more object rather than subject to the negotiations. As a result, the Commission was to be somewhat marginalized during the IGC (Galloway 2001) . The Commission did draw attention to some of the structural dynamics, such as the inadequacy of current decision rules for a swifter progress on the objectives set (Prodi 2000: 3) . It is nonetheless generally conceded that the Commission's contribution was sub-optimal in that respect. For example, it contributed no substantial comprehensive paper The European Parliament failed to replicate the capacity it had demonstrated in the runup to and during the Amsterdam IGC, and was unable to exploit the enhanced role afforded it in the IGC proceedings at Nice. For example, the EP missed the chance to take the initiative during the important agenda-setting phase waiting to submit its IGC opinion until such time as the principal issues had already largely been framed (Gray and Stubb 2001: 9-10; Neuhold 2006 ).
Socialization, deliberation, and learning processes
Processes of socialization, deliberation, and learning were hamstrung throughout the Nice IGC. Crucially, national JHA officials and ministers-so successfully distracted at the
Amsterdam IGC by the Dutch Presidency's introduction of an Action Plan Against Organized
Crime-were not so easily diverted from the defence of their IGC interests the second time around. A sizeable fraction of national JHA officials was sceptical of the Amsterdam provisions and sought to limit further loss of control (Guiraudon 2003: 279) . Their views were fed into the formation of national positions through the process of inter-ministerial coordination. This led to strict and stringent instructions to IGC Representatives, militating against reasoned discussion on the merits of the issues at hand. Cooperative norms, such as reciprocity, that tend to lead to the realization of an enlarged common interest, were also countervailed by such constraints. Secondly, controversy stemming from disputes over the balance of power between small and big member states generated distrust among negotiators which was inevitably carried over to other areas, including JHA. Under such circumstances, socialization and communicative action processes were by and large stillborn. Thirdly, the large number of issues on the QMV agenda meant that even prominent and controversial ones, like JHA, were allotted insufficient time to accommodate reasoned debate on the pros and cons of extending QMV. Finally, the shorter life span of the Representatives Group left little time for intense enmeshment and socialization processes to unfold (interviews 2002, 2004) . 
Countervailing forces

Via the Convention to the Treaty of Lisbon
In a departure from the standard method of preparing EU Treaty reforms, the Laeken Declaration had also called for more democracy and transparency. The two solutions at hand-increased involvement of the EP and a greater role for national parliaments-were not equal competitors, given the strong predisposition in favour of the Community method, and especially QMV. As ministers could be outvoted in the Council, greater EP involvement was held to be a surer remedy for the democratic deficit. Laeken was not the first summit where these aims had been enumerated, 6 yet they were arguably formulated in stronger terms, pursued more enthusiastically and taken more seriously than at previous IGCs (interview 2004).
The role of supranational institutions
The Commission acted with considerably greater assertiveness in the JHA debate throughout 
Socialization, deliberation, and learning processes
The markedly increased effect of socialization, deliberation, and learning processes at the Convention, which also influenced the outcome at subsequent IGCs, is perhaps one of the most notable reversals since the Nice IGC. This was facilitated by several favourable conditions in the Convention setting: (1) the Convention began with an initial phase of listening and reflection during which expectations and visions could be freely shared. This generated a deeper understanding of other members' ideas and softened pre-conceived opinions (Kleine and Risse 2005) . (2) The quantity of interaction-over fifty sessions of both the Plenary and the Praesidium held within eighteen months-reinforced the development of an 'esprit de corps' and a strong sense of responsibility for a successful outcome (Göler 2003) . (3) Convention members enjoyed a remarkable degree of autonomy and were largely unbound by governmental briefs (Maurer 2003: 134 ; but see Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2004) .
Moreover, in contrast to the preceding IGCs, domestic bureaucracies could do little to hinder the deliberation process as government representatives were not generally obliged to go through inter-ministerial coordination processes for the formation of national positions (Maurer 2003: 136) . (4) The atmosphere, spirit, and negotiating structure made it very difficult for members of the Convention to reject something without explanation, or without entering into a reasoned discussion where one's arguments would become subject to scrutiny (Closa 2004: 201) . In such an environment, good arguments, validated on the basis of accepted criteria, carried greater persuasive weight, and were therefore more likely to prevail in the debate.
Consequently, the strong functional (and exogenous) rationales for further communitarization were afforded a window to gain acceptance by actors and unfold their logic. In such deliberative process, one would expect negotiators to concur more fully with the final outcome, which would seem more likely to take the form of a reasoned consensus rather than simple compromise. My interviewing suggests that the Title IV Convention outcome was largely perceived as such. The same logic applies to the Draft Constitutional Treaty as a whole, albeit to a lesser extent, increasing the moral weight and impact of the Convention text and problematizing significant departures from this consensus for negotiators at subsequent IGCs (Closa 2004) , not least because member states were very much part of it.
Moreover, there was a general feeling that the Convention had done a good job. negotiations on most (non-institutional) issues at the subsequent IGCs. In a way, it turned into the default setting (Beach 2005: 199) . The bonding strength, with regard to migration issues, was such that the Convention text on these issues was not reopened.
What has been presented above as socialization, deliberation, and learning is difficult to substantiate within given space limitations. 7 Nonetheless, interviewees consistently described the negotiations in terms of arguing and reasoning, either without being prodded, or when asked to choose from a range of potential characterizations. In addition, negotiators generally avoided pointing to hierarchy, status, qualifications, or other sources of power when making their statements, and thus were presumably reluctant to add non-discursive authority to their arguments (interview with K. Hänsch 2004). Moreover, speakers' utterances in the plenary seem to be very consistent with their statements in other forums (e.g. Vitorino 2001 Vitorino , 2002a Vitorino , 2002b , which is likewise suggestive of truthful arguing. Furthermore, 'powerful' actors did not prevail in the Convention where their arguments were not persuasive. For example, the German Foreign Minister, the UK government representative, and others sought to reintroduce unanimity for the (whole) area of immigration (Fischer 2003; Hain 2003 ). They
were not successful as their case was not convincing given the powerful rationales for further communitarization pointed out above (interview 2004). Finally, it can be assumed that when issues which produced deadlock in a bargaining-like setting, such as migration issues at Nice, 7 But also see the general indications in the literature (Closa 2004; Göler 2003; Maurer 2003; Niemann 2006 ). For indicators of communicative action and persuasion, see Checkel (2001) and Niemann (2004) .
can be advanced or resolved in a more discursive setting, deliberation and arguing are likely to have played a role (cf. Kleine and Risse 2010) .
Countervailing forces
The 2004). Most of the few modifications to Title IV issues, for example on immigrants' access to the labour market, were made in the final phase of the Convention, also termed the 'pre-IGC stage', where bargaining behaviour began to (re-)emerge (Norman 2003 ).
The few exceptions to full communitarization, apart from the growing shadow of the IGC, can be explained by the exceptionally strong instances of countervailing pressures associated with them. Most notably, exclusion of the right to determine access to the labour market by third-country nationals can be attributed to strong constraints in Germany. Here, the CDU/CSU opposition is said to have 'blackmailed' the government not to give in on that question, as otherwise it would block the domestic immigration bill in the Bundesrat. The government also feared that the conservative opposition would seek to make political capital from the issue, on which opinion polls suggested most Germans were rather sceptical and cautious (cf. Frankfurter Rundschau online 9 July 2003; 3 May 2004). Due to its considerable bonding strength, described above, the Convention text became the default position (Beach 2005: 199) . This integrative base line to the negotiations, coupled with the fact that migration issues were almost entirely kept off the agenda, left little opportunity for countervailing pressures to exert significant influence on subsequent discussions leading to the Treaty of Lisbon (interviews 2004 Lisbon (interviews , 2007 .
Conclusion
The revised neo-functionalist account-based on (a) functional pressures; (b) the role of supranational institutions; (c) socialization, deliberation and learning processes; and (d) countervailing pressures-presented in section 1 appears to provide a robust framework for an analysis of the past three Treaty revision negotiations concerning the Europeanization of migration policy. The variation in hypothesized pressures correlates to the outcomes at Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon, and the above analysis has substantiated the mechanisms and processes through which these dynamics and countervailing forces unfolded. It has been demonstrated that the EU has developed a complex but increasingly communitarized migration regime that has evolved from loose and modest intergovernmental cooperation outside the Treaty framework to increasingly supranational governance. The development is characterized in particular by greater involvement by the Community institutions and substantially more decision-making by qualified majority.
At the level of policy-making, since the late 1990s, the framework for EU migration policy has been arranged into sequential five-year plans that build on the provisions of the Treaty. The Tampere Action Plan (1999-204) was followed by the Hague Programme (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ), which was succeeded by the Stockholm Action Plan (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . These programmes indicate that the EU now plays a central role in setting the migration agenda. It is important to note, however, that these three programmes do not mean that all the specified goals have been attained. Areas such as asylum policy and the fight against irregular immigration have been substantially developed. In terms of asylum, the continuous flow of measures agreed since the mid-1990s has mainly attempted to standardize national approaches to the processing of asylum applications, the reception of asylum-seekers, and the recognition of persons in need of refugee or some other kind of protection status. In contrast, the evolution of EU policies on the integration of migrants and particularly on labour migration are lagging behind (Boswell and Geddes 2011) . As for the latter issue, efforts to coordinate admissions policies at EU level have been obstructed by resistance from member states.
In addition, it should be emphasized that there is no EU-wide migration policy approach.
With the establishment of 'mutual recognition' as a key principle of governance in the Union, and the use of directives that leave substantial leeway for member state administrations in terms of their implementation, there is considerable scope for adaptation with 'national colours' (Boswell and Geddes 2011) . Furthermore, throughout the last decade member governments have often managed to maintain their national interests in the adoption of legislation on the basis of lowest common denominator agreements (e.g. Lauter and Niemann 2008) . Member governments clearly cannot be written out of the equation altogether. They continue to play an important role in the policy process. However, they no longer constitute the only relevant actors as inter-institutional processes have become gradually more important as a result of (ongoing) Europeanization processes. 
